Fixing International Finance: Between International Rule-Making and Domestic Cosmetic Compliance by Pagliari, S.
Pagliari, S. (2014). Fixing International Finance: Between International Rule-Making and Domestic 
Cosmetic Compliance. International Studies Review, 16(4), pp. 673-675. doi: 10.1111/misr.12173 
City Research Online
Original citation: Pagliari, S. (2014). Fixing International Finance: Between International Rule-
Making and Domestic Cosmetic Compliance. International Studies Review, 16(4), pp. 673-675. doi: 
10.1111/misr.12173 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/6809/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Fixing international finance: between international rule-making and domestic 
cosmetic compliance 
Review By Stefano Pagliari 
Department of International Politics, City University London 
 
 
This is a pre-publication version of a book review that appears in the International 
Studies Review. If you wish to cite it please consult the final published version for the 
correct pagination.  
 
 
International Harmonization of Financial Regulation? The politics of global diffusion 
of the Basel Capital Accord. By Hyoung-Kyu Chey. Routledge, London & New York, 
2014. 232 pp., $160, hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0415812429). 
 
 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008 to 2010 revealed a number of failures and gaps in 
the existing international financial regulatory architecture, and placed the issue of 
financial reforms at the centre of the international public policy agenda. At the same 
time, the crisis has also refocused the attention of academia on this topic, with a 
variety of scholars from different disciplines analyzing the plethora of “international 
standards” that have been introduced since the beginning crisis to fix these 
international regulatory failures.  
The book by Hyoung-Kyu Chey is not one of these. On the contrary, this volume 
looks back at an international that been negotiated substantially long before the 
crisis, the Basel Agreement of 1988. This represents a milestone in the history of the 
international efforts to strengthen financial stability in an age of globalization by 
harmonizing financial regulatory policies, but it is hardly a new area of inquiry. 
Despite this, the contribution of this volume is likely to prove highly relevant for the 
literature investigating more contemporary attempts to fix the international 
architecture and for understanding how these attempts may fail in achieving their 
goals. 
Compared to previous academic works on the Basel Agreement, Chey’s book shifts 
the analytical focus of his analysis in two ways. First, rather than focusing on 
understanding the design of international standards, the volume explores their 
implementation at the domestic level. Second, while most of the existing studies 
have focused on the great powers informing the development of the international 
financial agenda, in particular the US and more recently the EU, this book focuses 
primarily on those countries that are called upon implementing such rules without 
having significant influence over their design. In particular, the empirical contribution 
of this volume is represented by in-depth analysis of the adoption of the Basel 
Agreement within Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  
This analysis of these three cases demonstrates how despite the frequent 
description of the Basel Agreement as a “global standard” whose success exceeded 
the narrow membership of the Basel Committee, the adoption of the agreement in 
these countries frequently conceals what the author calls ‘cosmetic compliance’. 
These are instances in which authorities manipulate its implementation in ways that 
help domestic actors to formally comply but in practice still defeat its objective.  
The main analytical contribution of the volume can be found in the investigation of 
what factors have driven cosmetic compliance with international standards. The book 
tackles two widely established conjectures within the literature regarding the role of 
external pressures from powerful states and from markets in inducing convergence 
with international best practices. These are presented by the author as largely 
unable to prevent a significant amount of cosmetic compliance in the implementation 
of international financial standards.  The analysis presented in the volume points 
instead towards domestic political conditions within these countries as the primary 
factors limiting the extent to which countries comply with international financial rules. 
The compatibility between international standards and the existing regulatory 
arrangements in different countries, the opposition from a variety of politically 
influential domestic business groups within and outside the financial industry, and 
limited independence of regulatory authorities from the political system are some of 
the factors presented as causing cosmetic compliance with international standards. 
From this perspective, the volume makes an important contribution towards 
unpacking the link between link between international regulatory policymaking and 
domestic politics. Unfortunately, the implications of these findings for the broader 
literature on international regulatory politics beyond finance are not explored by this 
study. This narrow focus is likely to limit the appeal of this volume primarily to 
researchers exploring the politics of financial regulation rather than to a broader 
readership.  
Within the context of this subfield, the themes and findings presented by Chey in this 
volume are likely to become increasingly relevant in next few years. As the 
unprecedented number of international financial regulations negotiated in response 
to the crisis are moving from the international drawing board towards the domestic 
implementation phase, this book offers a key challenge for the literature: to what 
extent are the patterns of cosmetic compliance described in this volume 
characterizing also the regulatory response to the global financial crisis?  
Some of the conditions identified by the author has limiting compliance continue to 
persist. International financial standards continue to remain instances of ‘soft law’, 
with no legally binding obligations for the members of the main international financial 
institutions to implement them at the domestic level.  Moreover, as the international 
regulatory agenda becomes larger, its compatibility with the characteristics of 
different national regulatory systems among G20 members and beyond becomes 
more contested, thus further encouraging cosmetic compliance. At the same time, 
different institutional innovations that have been introduced since the period covered 
in this volume, such as the expansion in the membership of the Basel Committee to 
incorporate emerging markets, and the institutionalization of peer-review processes 
under the aegis of the Financial Stability Board. Future scholarship will need to 
investigate the impact of these institutional innovations over the implementation of 
international financial standards. 
A second question for the literature that emerges from the analysis in this volume is 
more prescriptive in nature: should we be concerned about the continuation of 
deviations between the standards being negotiated internationally and those being 
implemented domestically? The book does not take an explicit position on this 
question. The author clearly states that the book is not intended to be a defense of or 
support for “international standards”. At the same time, the book makes a convincing 
case that the effectiveness of international standards in achieving their objectives will 
be influenced by the fit between these rules and the specific characteristics of the 
financial system in different countries. It is therefore debatable to what extent the 
implementation of financial standards designed within a small club of regulatory 
authorities from developed countries represent the right recipe for a wider range of 
emerging markets and developing countries. On the contrary, a certain degree of 
‘cosmetic compliance’ may be regarded at times as a welcome corrective to the ‘one-
size-fits-all’ bias that characterizes the international financial standards agenda. But 
what is the level of cosmetic compliance that can be tolerated without generating 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage that may jeopardize collective efforts to 
reinforce financial stability? In which areas of the financial system should cosmetic 
compliance be tolerated? These are key questions for the future scholarship on this 
topic and Hyoung-kye Chey’s account of the implementation of the Basel Accord 
provides a helpful starting point for those scholars that will venture in this direction. 
 
  
